FCC Equipment Authorization Program – National Security & Prohibited Entities

Current understanding

To be populated as evidence accumulates.

Evidence log

• 2026-10-22 — Blocking Foreign Cellular Modules in Defense Systems Act of 2026: cross-connection with blocking-foreign-cellular-modules-defense-systems-act-2026: Both target foreign-origin radio/cellular equipment on national-security grounds; the FCC program governs civilian equipment authorization while the bill targets DoD system components. (novelty: 2)
• 2026-09-11 — Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through the Equipment Authorization Program: FCC final rule closes the component-parts loophole by barring authorization of devices containing logic-bearing hardware from Covered List entities, requires full recertification (not permissive changes) for any equipment modifications by Covered List entities, and obligates online marketplaces to display FCC IDs at the point of sale. (novelty: 3)
• 2026-07-14 — Blocking CCP Spy Tech Act of 2026: House companion Blocking CCP Spy Tech Act of 2026 (HR9687) referred to House Energy & Commerce and Armed Services Committees, mirroring the Senate S4586 effort to restrict CCP-linked surveillance equipment and potentially layering onto the FCC prohibited-entity/covered-list framework. (novelty: 2)
• 2026-05-20 — Blocking CCP Spy Tech Act of 2026: Blocking CCP Spy Tech Act of 2026 (S4586) introduced in the Senate; if enacted, could layer additional restrictions on CCP-linked surveillance equipment atop the FCC covered-list/prohibited-entity framework. (novelty: 2)
• 2026-07-27 — Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks: FCC Second FNPRM on submarine cable landing licenses proposes routine conditions targeting foreign-adversary risk, paralleling the prohibited-entity/covered-list framework used in equipment authorization by extending it to SLTE owners/operators. (novelty: 3)
• 2026-02-24 — ACERO Act: cross-connection with acero-act-wildfire-uas: Both restrict procurement/authorization of equipment from China-linked entities, applying the covered-entity framework to UAS acquisition for the NASA wildfire program. (novelty: 3)
• 2026-06-24 — ICTS Supply Chain Security Act of 2026: cross-connection with icts-supply-chain-security-act-2026: Parallel authorities restricting communications equipment from prohibited entities; FCC Section 2 covered-list overlaps with ICTS covered transactions. (novelty: 2)
• 2026-05-08 — Protecting Against National Security Threats in Domestic Telecommunications Service: FCC proposes parallel Covered List enforcement mechanism in section 214 domestic telecommunications authorizations (proposed rule), extending the same national-security prohibited-entity framework used in equipment authorization to carrier service authority. (novelty: 3)
• 2026-05-15 — Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment Authorization Program: FCC final rule (2026-05-15) adopts fast-track review pathway for Trusted Test Labs, updates post-market surveillance procedures, establishes confidential reporting channels for national security threats, and consolidates prohibited-entity screening across the equipment authorization program. (novelty: 3)

Open questions

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