Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks
Key claim: The FCC’s Second FNPRM seeks comment on routine licensing conditions for submarine cable landing licensees and SLTE owners/operators to address evolving national security risks posed by foreign adversaries.
Abstract
(Proposed Rule · Federal Communications Commission) In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Second FNPRM) that seeks to further prevent evolving national security risks associated with submarine line terminal equipment (SLTEs) posed by foreign adversaries. The Second FNPRM seeks comment on the routine conditions that the Commission should consider to improve its oversight of SLTE owners and operators. The Second FNPRM seeks comment on whether the Commission should adopt routine conditions for cable landing licensees that are subject to our current licensing requirement, as amended. With respect to SLTE, the Second FNPRM also seeks comment on whether to consider consistent or differing routine conditions for cable landing licensees that own and/or operate SLTE on their licensed submarine cable, or owns an SLTE and either owns or leases the underlying fiber, capacity, or spectrum, or leases the SLTE and the underlying fiber, capacity, or spectrum to another entity. Finally, the Second FNPRM seeks comment on whether it should adopt any other routine conditions for submarine cable landing licensees, including SLTE owners and operators.
Why this matters
Submarine cables carry the vast majority of transoceanic data and are increasingly viewed as high-value targets for foreign intelligence collection and disruption. Expanding routine license conditions to SLTE owners/operators materially broadens the compliance perimeter beyond cable owners to include vendors of the terminal equipment that touches U.S. traffic, with practical implications for foreign investment, procurement, and reporting. The proceeding fits a wider FCC pattern of using licensing conditions to operationalize national-security screening against designated foreign adversaries.