People v Fenderson
Key claim: The Michigan Supreme Court held that police violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel by reinitiating interrogation after he invoked counsel and by telling him he did not have and could not obtain an attorney.
Abstract
Michigan Supreme Court opinion decided 2026-07-14. Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan
Syllabus Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kimberly K. Muschong
PEOPLE v FENDERSON
Docket No. 167391. Argued on application for leave to appeal March 12, 2026. Decided
July 14, 2026.
Daren D. Fenderson was bound over to the Wayne Circuit Court on charges of first-degree
premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a); felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b; and escape from
lawful custody, MCL 750.197a. Defendant was arrested and jailed in connection with a fatal
shooting. Police read defendant his rights under Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966), but police
were unable to interrogate defendant at that time because they believed that he was intoxicated.
The following day, Detroit Police Sergeant Reginald Beasley and Detective Douglas Williams
conducted a videorecorded interrogation. Beasley provided standard Miranda warnings, and
defendant voluntarily signed an advice-of-rights form. After an hour of questioning, police told
defendant that there were a lot of holes in his story and that they had conducted research, including
watching surveillance videos and speaking with witnesses. Beasley further indicated that someone
who looked at the evidence would ask themselves whether defendant was a callous killer; Beasley
told defendant several times that pictures of the victim were “fucked up” and that police had a
“video of it happening.” At this point, defendant invoked his right to counsel. Beasley asked if
defendant had an attorney. Defendant indicated that he would need appointed counsel and asked
how long that would take. Beasley said that he was not sure but that he would “make a couple
phone calls.”
Beasley returned about 40 minutes after defendant’s invocation and told him that he was
“trying to get that attorney.” Two hours and 45 minutes after defendant invoked his right to
counsel, Beasley returned; he did not address defendant or provide him with information about
efforts to locate an attorney. Beasley was accompanied by a uniformed officer who removed
defendant’s handcuffs and then had defendant turn around so that he could handcuff defendant
with his arms behind his back. Defendant then asked where his lawyer was. The audio of the
interrogation video is difficult to decipher, but Beasley responded either “You don’t got one” or
“You don’t get one.” Defendant expressed confusion, and Beasley told defendant that police tried
to call a lawyer but nobody was available and defendant had no money. Defendant asked whether
he could use the money he had in his possession when he was arrested, and Beasley said that he
couldn’t use that money.
Defendant then asked, “So what’s going on?” Beasley stated that defendant had asked for an attorney and that he could not speak to defendant without one, “[s]o the story you got is the story we gon’ go with.” Defendant again expressed confusion, and Beasley asked defendant what he was confused about. Defendant responded that he didn’t know what was going on and that police hadn’t told him anything. Beasley stated that police would take defendant back to the Detroit Detention Center and submit a warrant that a prosecutor would review. Defendant told Beasley that he didn’t know what that meant, and Beasley responded that defendant had requested an attorney so he couldn’t speak to defendant about the case, but that if defendant wanted to talk, defendant had to say he wanted to talk without an attorney. Defendant then repeatedly said that he wanted “to get this over with,” and Beasley responded that he could go over defendant’s rights with him again if he agreed to talk without an attorney. Defendant agreed to talk without an attorney and again expressed that he wanted “to get this over with.” Beasley stated that he didn’t want defendant to feel compelled to talk to him, but that if defendant wanted to talk without an attorney present, Beasley would talk to defendant. Defendant said, “Yeah.” Beasley again stated that he didn’t want defendant to feel forced to do anything and asked, “Is that something you want to do?” Defendant said, “Yes.”
Beasley and the uniformed officers accompanying him left the interrogation room, and
defendant started crying. Another sergeant, who was not connected with the investigation and who had not previously spoken to defendant, entered the room. Defendant said, “I don’t understand this.” The sergeant stated that his role was to reestablish defendant’s rights, and he read the standard Miranda warnings again. After each warning, the sergeant asked defendant if he understood his rights. Defendant responded with a mix of verbal agreement and nonverbal affirmative head nods. When the sergeant asked if anyone had forced, threatened, or coerced defendant to make a statement, defendant responded, “See, that’s what I . . . I don’t understand what’s going on.” The sergeant asked if defendant wanted to talk to police, and defendant agreed. Defendant initialed another advice-of-rights form, and the sergeant left. Beasley and Williams returned, and defendant made incriminating statements.
Defendant moved to suppress the incriminating statements in the trial court on the grounds
that he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his Miranda right to counsel. The court, Wanda A. Evans, J., granted defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that police communications with defendant had frustrated the advice of rights required by Miranda. The trial court also concluded that police reinitiated the interrogation after defendant’s invocation by readministering Miranda warnings. The prosecution sought leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals, SWARTZLE, P.J., and SERVITTO, J. (GARRETT, J., dissenting), reversed the suppression of defendant’s statements in an unpublished per curiam opinion, issued June 6, 2024 (Docket No. 367926). Defendant sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court ordered and heard oral argument on the application. 516 Mich 934 (2025).
In an opinion by Justice THOMAS, joined by Chief Justice CAVANAGH and Justices
BERNSTEIN, WELCH, BOLDEN, and HOOD, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held:
Defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda were violated. Under Edwards v
Arizona, 451 US 477 (1981), statements following the invocation of counsel are admissible only if counsel is made available to the suspect for questioning or if the state shows that the suspect himself reinitiated the investigation. In this case, defendant initially waived his Miranda rights but later asserted his right to appointed counsel. However, defendant was not provided counsel and was told he did not have and could not obtain counsel. The statements police made in
Why this matters
The Michigan Supreme Court held that police violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel by reinitiating interrogation after he invoked counsel and by telling him he did not have and could not obtain an attorney.