People v Soriano
Key claim: The Michigan Supreme Court held that a defendant’s Miranda waiver was invalid because severe LSD intoxication prevented a knowing and intelligent waiver, and that admission of his self-incriminating statements was not harmless error given the centrality of those statements to proving specific intent for assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct.
Abstract
Michigan Supreme Court opinion decided 2026-07-07. Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan
Syllabus Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kimberly K. Muschong
PEOPLE v SORIANO
Docket No. 167373. Argued on application for leave to appeal December 10, 2025.
Decided July 7, 2026.
Zebadiah J. Soriano was convicted following a jury trial in the Grand Traverse Circuit
Court of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct (CSC) involving penetration, MCL
750.520g(1). Defendant and his friend, AC, took LSD together at the home AC shared with her
mother. At some point after ingesting the LSD, defendant removed his pants and underwear,
forced himself on top of AC, and began to grope her. AC testified that before the assault, defendant
said, “We’re going to do this,” and “we’re going to do this, right?” AC was able to get away from
defendant and go to her mother for help. Defendant eventually left the house while still naked
from the waist down, and AC’s mother called the police. After officers found defendant, he was
arrested and taken to the hospital. The sheriff’s deputy who arrested defendant and was with him
at the hospital observed that, when he first encountered him, defendant seemed to be hallucinating,
and he was confused at the hospital while “coming down” from the effects of the drug. The deputy
read defendant his Miranda 1 rights about an hour after he was found by the police. According to
the deputy, defendant waived his rights and agreed to speak to the deputy. During the
interrogation, defendant stated, “I am a rapist and I am fucked.”
The trial court, Kevin A. Elsenheimer, J., denied defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress
the statements elicited following his waiver. Following his conviction, defendant moved for a new
trial or, in the alternative, an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to secure an expert witness on intoxication. The trial court denied the motions.
Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals, SWARTZLE, P.J., and SERVITTO, J. (GARRETT, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), affirmed in an unpublished, per curiam opinion, issued
May 30, 2024 (Docket No. 359165). Defendant applied for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court,
and in lieu of granting leave, the Court ordered oral argument on the application. ___ Mich ___;
20 NW3d 594 (2025).
In an opinion by Justice THOMAS, joined by Chief Justice CAVANAGH and Justices ZAHRA,
WELCH, BOLDEN, and HOOD, the Supreme Court held:
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
Defendant’s Miranda waiver was not valid because it was not knowing and intelligent. The admission of the statements he made under the invalid waiver was not harmless error because the statements were highly prejudicial in demonstrating defendant’s intent to commit a sexual penetration at the time of the assault. Therefore, defendant was entitled to a new trial.
1. Defendant’s waiver was not knowing and intelligent. Courts are to consider the totality
of the circumstances present at the time of the alleged waiver, which requires consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, including the suspect’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and whether the suspect has the capacity to understand the Miranda warnings, their Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. Additionally, because of the impact that intoxication may have on a person’s mental state, special care must be taken in assessing a waiver when there is evidence that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
Defendant had been hospitalized and displayed erratic and confused behavior before and
during the questioning by police. The parties agreed that defendant had taken a large amount of LSD prior to the interrogation and was suffering from severe hallucinations prior to and at the time he was taken into police custody. Although defendant was no longer hallucinating when he was read the Miranda warnings about one hour after being taken into custody, the question was not whether he was hallucinating but whether he had the mental capacity to understand his rights and the import of waiving those rights when he was given the warnings. The short period of time between defendant’s erratic behaviors and being advised of his Miranda rights supports the conclusion that defendant was not able to understand his rights at the time of waiver. The officer who questioned defendant testified that defendant seemed “confused” during the questioning, and defendant testified that he did not know why he was Mirandized and did not understand the interrogating officer’s questions. Although defendant’s admitted statements evidenced that he had some understanding that he was in trouble, this did not equate to an understanding of his Miranda rights and making a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. Defendant did not satisfy many of the considerations that would indicate he had the ability to exercise discretion and the competence to understand his rights. Defendant’s age, lack of experience with law enforcement, and lack of sleep contributed to the determination that he did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver. Accordingly, the prosecution did not establish that defendant’s waiver was knowing and intelligent by a preponderance of the evidence, and the alleged waiver was invalid.
2. The prosecution did not demonstrate that the erroneous admission of the challenged
statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals concluded that any Miranda error was harmless because AC’s testimony provided more than sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to have found defendant guilty, given that a victim’s testimony can be sufficient by itself to support a CSC conviction. However, the Court of Appeals erred in its harmless-error analysis. A preserved error is not harmless simply because the reviewing court concludes that the jury reached the right result. The question is whether an average jury would have found the prosecution’s case significantly less persuasive without the erroneously admitted testimony. That is, the prosecution must prove that there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. Assault with intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration is a specific intent crime that requires the defendant to possess a particular criminal intent beyond the act. The prosecution was required to prove that defendant committed an assault and that he had an intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration. The evidence supporting the intent element was: (1) defendant’s removal of his pants and underwear, (2) AC’s tes
Why this matters
The Michigan Supreme Court held that a defendant’s Miranda waiver was invalid because severe LSD intoxication prevented a knowing and intelligent waiver, and that admission of his self-incriminating statements was not harmless error given the centrality of those statements to proving specific intent for assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct.