People v Klungle
Key claim: The Michigan Supreme Court held that a defense attorney’s unconsented concession of guilt on any charge violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of autonomy to maintain innocence, constitutes structural error requiring automatic reversal, and does not require a contemporaneous objection to preserve the claim.
Abstract
Michigan Supreme Court opinion decided 2026-07-06. Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan
Syllabus Chief Justice: Justices: Megan K. Cavanagh Brian K. Zahra Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden Kimberly A. Thomas Noah P. Hood
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been Reporter of Decisions: prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. Kimberly K. Muschong
PEOPLE v KLUNGLE
Docket Nos. 168010 and 168011. Argued on application for leave to appeal April 8, 2026.
Decided July 6, 2026.
Richard E. Klungle was convicted following a jury trial in the Emmet Circuit Court of one
count of trespassing, MCL 750.552, and two counts of resisting or obstructing a police officer,
MCL 750.81d(1). Defendant moved for a new trial and an evidentiary hearing, arguing that he
was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and right to maintain his innocence when trial
counsel conceded defendant’s guilt on the trespassing charge. During the hearing, trial counsel
testified that defendant had maintained his innocence of the charges, but counsel had used his “best
legal judgment” by deciding to concede guilt on trespassing in the hope that he would maintain his
credibility with the jury and obtain an acquittal on the felony charges. Counsel did not inform
defendant of his plan to concede guilt, and defendant did not tell him to concede guilt. The trial
court, Jennifer Deegan, J., denied the motion for a new trial, and the Court of Appeals, CAMERON,
P.J., and JANSEN and SWARTZLE, JJ., affirmed. ___ Mich App ___ (November 19, 2024) (Docket
Nos. 364125 and 367795). Defendant applied for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court,
which ordered oral argument on the application. ___ Mich ___; 20 NW3d 573 (2025).
In a unanimous opinion by Justice BOLDEN, the Supreme Court held:
Trial counsel’s concession of guilt on the trespassing charge violated defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right of autonomy to maintain innocence on all charges as the objective of his defense.
Under McCoy v Louisiana, 584 US 414 (2018), this was a structural error that requires automatic
reversal.
1. The Sixth Amendment, US Const, Am VI, guarantees a criminal defendant the right to
the assistance of counsel for their defense. When represented by counsel, a defendant generally
relinquishes control over trial management to their attorney, but the accused retains complete
autonomy over certain fundamental choices, including the right to decide that the objective of the
defense is to assert innocence. In McCoy, the United States Supreme Court held that when a client
expressly asserts that the objective of their defense is to maintain innocence of the charged acts,
the client’s lawyer must abide by that objective and may not override it by conceding guilt. The
Court further held that ineffective-assistance-of-counsel jurisprudence did not apply in these
situations because a client’s autonomy, not counsel’s competence, was at issue. The violation of
a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of autonomy is a structural error requiring reversal without a showing of prejudice. Although McCoy was a capital murder case, a defendant’s right to maintain innocence applies in all criminal prosecutions, and the Sixth Amendment principles from McCoy are not limited to capital cases.
2. Under McCoy, the concession of guilt by trial counsel here violated defendant’s right
of autonomy to claim innocence as the objective of his defense. Like in McCoy, the expressed pretrial objective of defendant was to maintain his innocence, and as in McCoy, trial counsel was aware of defendant’s desire. Additionally, like in McCoy, defendant here testified at trial and maintained his innocence while doing so. While communication between defendant and trial counsel had deteriorated by the time of trial, what matters under McCoy is trial counsel’s confirmation at the evidentiary hearing that during his conversations with defendant about the objective of the defense for trial, defendant maintained his innocence. Knowing this, trial counsel could not disregard defendant’s prior statements and concede guilt without first consulting him. The lower courts’ reliance on the fact that defendant never told counsel not to concede guilt turned the inquiry on its head, ignoring the attorney’s duty of consultation and placing the burden on a client to tell his attorney what not to do. The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the facts of this case were more similar to Florida v Nixon, 543 US 175 (2004), another capital case in which defense counsel believed that the best strategy to save his client’s life was to concede guilt. Nixon is plainly distinguishable from this case because its holding is limited to situations in which defense counsel consults the client regarding a concession strategy and the client is unresponsive. Here, there was no dispute that such a consultation did not happen, so the rule from Nixon did not apply.
3. A client need not contemporaneously object to their attorney’s conduct to establish a
Sixth Amendment claim that their right of autonomy was violated. The fact that the defendant in McCoy “adamantly” objected to his attorney’s concession when it was made at trial does not mean that the failure to do so is fatal in all other cases. The right of autonomy to maintain innocence is not lost simply because a client fails to contemporaneously object, particularly where the attorney never discusses a concession strategy with the client and therefore deprives the client of an adequate opportunity to object. Additionally, where a defendant is represented by counsel, that attorney acts and speaks on behalf of the defendant; trial courts generally do not allow the represented defendant to speak whenever they choose, and this case was no different. The record shows that defendant tried to speak during trial after defense counsel’s closing argument and again after the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, and on both occasions, the trial court instructed defendant to remain quiet and not interrupt. Requiring a defendant to contemporaneously object on their own behalf to their attorney’s conduct at trial would be impractical and inconsistent with our system of attorney-client representation. Nor is a contemporaneous objection by a client to their attorney’s concession of guilt necessary to preserve this type of Sixth Amendment claim. Assuming without deciding that a McCoy violation is an error that is subject to forfeiture, defendant preserved his claim by raising it with the trial court in a timely postjudgment motion for new trial and evidentiary hearing.
4. Defendant is entitled to a new trial on all charges because the structural error in
conceding guilt on the trespassing charge was intrinsically harmful given that it rendered unfair or unreliable the determining of guilt or innocence by the jury on the resisting-or-obstructing charges. Trial counsel contested the resisting-or-obstructing charges. But all the charges against defendant were i
Why this matters
The Michigan Supreme Court held that a defense attorney’s unconsented concession of guilt on any charge violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of autonomy to maintain innocence, constitutes structural error requiring automatic reversal, and does not require a contemporaneous objection to preserve the claim.