Tiburcio Pena-Cruz v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co
Key claim: When a car owner neither allowed nor forbade the driver to take the vehicle, Michigan no-fault PIP eligibility now turns on whether the driver had implied permission under all the facts, and this case was sent back for that analysis instead of a chain-of-permission shortcut.
Abstract
Michigan Court of Appeals opinion decided 2026-10-02. If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TIBURCIO PENA-CRUZ and JONATHAN PENA- FOR PUBLICATION GARCIA, October 02, 2026 10:19 AM Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v No. 364284 Wayne Circuit Court STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE LC No. 21-014679-NF INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
and
MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLACEMENT FACILITY and JOHN DOE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.
ON REMAND
Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and BORRELLO and BOONSTRA, JJ.
O’BRIEN, P.J.
This case returns to this Court following remand from our Supreme Court. The issue in
this case is whether MCL 500.3113(a) disqualified plaintiff Tiburcio Pena-Cruz from recovering no-fault benefits. MCL 500.3113(a) disqualifies a person from receiving no-fault benefits if, at the time of the accident, the person claiming benefits was using a vehicle that “was taken unlawfully,” and the person knew or should have known that the vehicle was taken unlawfully. MCL 500.3113(a). The dispute on appeal is whether the F-150 truck that Tiburcio was driving at the time of the collision was “taken unlawfully” within the meaning of MCL 500.3113(a). We previously concluded that Tiburcio took the vehicle unlawfully because we were bound by Swoope v Citizens Ins Co of the Midwest, 350 Mich App 104, 107; 29 NW3d 695 (2023), rev’d ___ Mich ___ (2026) (Swoope I), to conclude that Tiburcio’s use of the F-150 without the owner’s
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permission while knowing that he did not have a valid driver’s license rendered the taking “unlawful” for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). Pena-Cruz v State Farm Mutual Auto Ins Co, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 14, 2024 (Docket No. 364284), p 14, vacated by ___ Mich ___; 34 NW3d 857 (2026). Our Supreme Court reversed Swoope I, holding that the panel erred by concluding that the “plaintiff’s unlawful operation of the car barred her from recovering PIP benefits” because the relevant inquiry is not whether the vehicle was operated unlawfully but whether the vehicle was taken unlawfully. Swoope v Citizens Ins Co of the Midwest, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket No. No. 166790) (Swoope II); slip op at 17. Our Supreme Court thereafter vacated this Court’s prior opinion and remanded this case “for reconsideration in light Swoope [II].” Pena-Cruz v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, ___ Mich ___, ___; 34 NW3d 857, 857 (2026). Doing so, we announce a new test for the situation presented in this case.
Cases addressing the phrase “taken unlawfully” as used in MCL 500.3113(a) generally fall
into two categories: those in which an owner explicitly gave the driver permission to take the owner’s vehicle and those in which the owner explicitly forbade the driver from taking the owner’s vehicle. This case presents a third situation: the owner of the vehicle in this case neither gave Tiburcio permission to take her vehicle nor forbade Tiburcio from taking the vehicle. We hold that, in these circumstances, the relevant inquiry is whether the driver took the vehicle with the owner’s implied permission. This determination will depend on all the facts and circumstances surrounding the driver’s taking of the vehicle, as well as the driver’s previous use of the vehicle. The trial court in this case relied exclusively on a chain-of-permissive-use theory to conclude that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Tiburcio lawfully took the F-150. We vacate that holding and remand for the trial court to apply the test announced in this opinion.
I. BASIC FACTS
The facts of this case were thoroughly laid out in this Court’s prior opinion, see Pena-Cruz,
unpub op at 2-4, and we will only briefly recite them here.
Plaintiffs, Tiburcio and his son, Jonathan Pena-Garcia, were involved in a serious car
collision on December 19, 2020, while Tiburcio was driving. The collision occurred while Tiburcio was stopped on the roadway waiting for an accident to clear. A second driver failed to see Tiburcio’s stopped vehicle and rear-ended him.
Tiburcio was driving an F-150 solely owned by his wife, Maria Garcia-Lopez. Despite
being married, Tiburcio and Maria were not living together, and they had not lived together for about two years prior to the collision. Maria purchased the F-150 involved in the collision in March 2020, and Tiburcio confirmed that he and Maria were not living together at that time.
Jonathan lived with Maria, and on the day of the collision, Maria gave Jonathan permission
to take her F-150. Maria denied giving Tiburcio permission to drive the F-150 on December 19, 2020, and she confirmed that Tiburcio had never driven the F-150 prior to that day. When asked if she would have let Tiburcio drive the F-150, Maria said, “Well, no, he doesn’t have a license.”
Tiburcio was the only individual who testified about how he came to be driving Maria’s F-
150 on the date of the collision. Tiburcio explained that, on the morning of the collision, Jonathan
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was giving Tiburcio a ride to work. Jonathan arrived at Tiburcio’s house very early in the morning, and Jonathan told Tiburcio that he was tired. So, according to Tiburcio, “it just made sense for [Tiburcio] to drive.” Tiburcio testified that he was not licensed to drive, but he nevertheless took the F-150 and drove it. Tiburcio knew that Maria was the owner of the F-150, and the day of the collision was the first time that he drove the F-150. When asked whether he had permission to drive the F-150, Tiburcio testified, “So, no. No, I didn’t ask for permission. As I’ve been saying, he came here to pick me up, my son, and he was tired so it just—it was easy for me to just drive to work then.” Tiburcio testified that even when he was living with Maria, he did not have keys to any vehicles—only house keys.
Following the collision, Tiburcio sought no-fault benefits from defendant State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. When State Farm refused to pay Tiburcio’s benefits, Tiburcio brought this action.
Following discovery, State Farm moved for summary disposition, arguing that Tiburcio
unlawfully took Maria’s F-150 on the day of the collision, so MCL 500.3113(a) disqualified him from receiving no-fault benefits. State Farm argued that Tiburcio took the F-150 unlawfully because Tiburcio never received Maria’s permission to drive it, and Tiburcio had no reason to believe that Maria would allow Tiburcio to take the F-150 in light of the fact that Tiburcio did not have a driver’s license and had never used the F-150 before.
In response, Tiburcio argued that his taking of the F-150 was lawful because Tiburcio
received permission to drive the vehicle from Jonathan, who Maria had allowed to take the vehicle, and Maria never told Jonathan or Tiburcio that Tiburcio was not allowed to use the F-150.
Following a hearing, the trial court concluded that there was a genuine issue of material
fact whether Tiburcio unlawfully took the F-150. The court agreed with Tiburcio that, because Maria never expressly prohibited Tiburcio from driving the F-150, the fact that Jonathan—who had Maria’s permission to take the F-150—gave Tiburcio permission to take the F-150 created a genuine issue of material fact
Why this matters
When a car owner neither allowed nor forbade the driver to take the vehicle, Michigan no-fault PIP eligibility now turns on whether the driver had implied permission under all the facts, and this case was sent back for that analysis instead of a chain-of-permission shortcut.