Mullin v. Al Otro Lado
Key claim: The Supreme Court ruled that migrants physically standing in Mexico at the U.S. border have no legal right under federal immigration law to be inspected or to apply for asylum — those rights only attach once a person actually crosses into the United States, meaning the government can legally turn people away before they set foot on U.S. soil.
Abstract
U.S. Supreme Court opinion decided 2026-06-25, by Samuel Alito. (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
MULLIN, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. v. AL OTRO LADO ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 25–5. Argued March 24, 2026—Decided June 25, 2026
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), 66 Stat. 163, gov- erns the process by which an alien who “arrives in the United States” is inspected by border officials, is deemed an applicant for admission, and may apply for asylum. The question in this case is when an alien who seeks to enter the United States from Mexico “arrives in the United States” within the meaning of that phrase in two key INA pro- visions—8 U. S. C. §§1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1): when the alien is standing in Mexico at the border, or only when the alien crosses the border and enters the country? In the spring of 2016, U. S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) began experiencing a surge of aliens seeking admission at ports of en- try along the U. S.-Mexico border, with numbers sometimes far exceed- ing safe and secure processing capacity. In November 2016, the De- partment of Homeland Security responded by adopting a policy of “metering” the number of arriving aliens whom CBP would inspect each day and allow to apply for asylum. To enforce the policy, officials stood on the U. S. side of the border and prevented aliens from entering the United States beyond the number the port could adequately pro- cess. The metering policy continued through the change in Presiden- tial administrations. In 2017, asylum seekers and the immigration- advocacy organization Al Otro Lado brought a putative class action against the Government in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, arguing that CBP’s enforcement of the metering policy unlawfully withheld inspection and asylum processing from aliens who arrive at the border and seek to enter the United States. The District Court certified a class of all noncitizens who seek 2 MULLIN v. AL OTRO LADO
Syllabus
or will seek to access the asylum process by presenting themselves at
certain ports on the U. S.-Mexico border and were or will be denied
access to that process by CBP officials. The court granted summary
judgment for the class and declared that the Government’s denial of
inspection and asylum processing to class members who are in the pro-
cess of arriving in the United States is unlawful regardless of the pur-
ported justification for doing so. The Government rescinded the me-
tering policy in November 2021, shortly after the District Court
entered summary judgment. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit then
affirmed in relevant part, holding that an alien “arrives in the United
States”—and thus must be inspected and may apply for asylum—when
the alien, while standing on the Mexico side of the border, encounters
a United States official at the border.
Held: An alien standing in Mexico does not “arriv[e] in the United States” by attempting, and failing, to set foot in this country. An alien “arrives in the United States” only when he crosses the border. The INA thus neither entitles an alien standing in Mexico to apply for asylum nor requires an immigration officer to inspect him. Pp. 7–18. (a) This case is not moot. The District Court’s declaratory judgment, which the Ninth Circuit affirmed, continues to bar the Government from using metering to deal with border surges within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit. The Government represents that it would like to resume the use of metering when border conditions warrant it. The controversy remains live because a ruling for the Government could reverse the declaratory judgment and thus give the Government the effectual relief it seeks. Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U. S. 165. P. 8, n. 7. (b) The phrase “arrives in the United States” in §§1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1) carries its ordinary meaning: A person arrives in a geo- graphic location only when he enters it. To “arrive” is to “reach a des- tination,” American Heritage Dictionary 102, and the preposition “in” means “[w]ithin the limits, bounds, or area of ” a place, id., at 910. A person arrives in a destination when he enters within its area—not before—and that conclusion does not change because someone or some- thing blocks entry. Everyday examples of how people ordinarily use the phrase “arrives in” confirm this understanding. Several features of statutory context support this ordinary-meaning reading. First, other provisions of the INA refer to both actual en- trance and attempted entrance into the United States, but §§1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1) contain no reference to attempted entry, and this fact signals that Congress enacted the disparate language “ ‘intentionally and purposefully.’ ” Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U. S. 200, 208. Second, the INA elsewhere refers to aliens who arrive near a land bor- der, language Congress could have used but did not use in the provi- sions at issue. Third, Congress easily could have required inspection Cite as: 609 U. S. ___ (2026) 3
Syllabus
of any alien who “arrives at” or “reaches” the border, as it did in an earlier provision allowing asylum applications by aliens “at a land bor- der or port of entry.” §1158(a) (1994 ed.). Fourth, Congress’s 1996 amendment replacing “at a land border or port of entry” with “arrives in the United States” suggests that these phrases should not be read to have the same meaning and that the current phrase requires aliens to be present in the United States. Pp. 8–11. © Respondents’ principal textual argument rests on the canon against surplusage. They observe that §1158(a)(1) allows asylum ap- plications by aliens who “arriv[e] in the United States” and also by those “physically present in the United States,” and they argue that the first phrase would be wholly redundant if read to require physical presence. This argument has some force but does not overcome the arguments pointing the opposite way. The anti-surplusage canon is not an iron rule; Congress sometimes “enacts provisions that are su- perfluous,” Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 564 U. S. 91, 107. Here, the superfluity is only partial, not total, and it is understanda- ble. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 both created expedited removal—a streamlined process for removal of arriving aliens—and inserted the “arrives in” language in §1158(a)(1) to correspond with the event—arrival—that triggered that new removal process. In any event, the Court would choose an inter- pretation that entails some redundancy over one that contradicts what words usually mean. Pp. 11–15. (d) Even if statutory text and context were not enough, the presump- tion against extraterritoriality would tip the scale against respond- ents’ interpretation. Nothing in the text of §1158(a)(1) or §§1225(a)(1) and (a)(3) manifests an unmistakable congressional intent to require that aliens be inspected and allowed to apply for asylum while they are outside the United States. The Court’s interpretation links inspection and the asylum process to wha
Why this matters
Supreme Court opinions in asylum litigation set binding precedent that reshapes what protections asylum seekers can invoke at U.S. borders and how enforcement agencies must — or need not — process their claims. Because Al Otro Lado has been a lead plaintiff in long-running challenges to metering, turnbacks, and asylum-transit rules, a ruling in the government’s favor could narrow judicial review of border processing, while a ruling against the government could preserve or extend procedural due-process protections. The practical effect on affected populations depends on the opinion’s specific holding and scope.