Blind Americans Return to Work Act of 2025
Key claim: The Blind Americans Return to Work Act of 2025 would establish a 20-year SSDI demonstration project allowing blind beneficiaries to continue receiving gradually reduced benefits when earning above the substantial gainful activity threshold, eliminating benefit termination due to work earnings.
Abstract
(HR1175 · 119th Congress) Blind Americans Return to Work Act of 2025 This bill requires the Social Security Administration to carry out a demonstration project during which blind Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) beneficiaries receive reduced benefits commensurate with income above certain thresholds. Under current law, only individuals who earn under a specified monthly income, known as the substantial gainful activity (SGA) threshold, are considered disabled and thereby eligible for SSDI benefits. For blind workers, this limit is $2,700 per month in 2025. SSDI beneficiaries may earn beyond the SGA threshold for a limited period of time, known as the trial work period , before their benefits are suspended and ultimately terminate. The bill establishes a 20-year demonstration project during which individuals who are entitled to SSDI benefits by reason of blindness and who earn above the SGA threshold continue to receive benefits at an amount gradually reduced commensurate with their earnings beyond a specified amount. During this period, blind workers’ SSDI benefits must be reduced by $1 for every $2 that a worker earns above the sum of (1) the SGA threshold, and (2) the worker’s expenses reasonably attributable to their work. The SGA threshold may not be used to determine whether an individual is disabled during this period, and blind workers’ SSDI benefits may not be terminated due to work-related earnings. The trial work period also must not apply. After 10 years, affected beneficiaries may opt out of the modified benefits structure. Latest action (2025-02-10): Referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means.
Why this matters
For blind Americans receiving SSDI, current rules create a ‘cash cliff’ at the Substantial Gainful Activity threshold that can make additional work financially punishing. A 20-year demonstration replacing termination with a gradual phase-down would test whether a smoother earnings-to-benefits curve increases labor force participation among blind beneficiaries, with implications for how disability programs balance income support against work incentives more broadly.