Drinking Water System Security Act of 2009
Key claim: This 2009 House bill would have required community water systems serving more than 3,300 people to assess sabotage risks, meet EPA security standards, train staff, and file emergency plans with EPA, but it never became law.
Abstract
(HR3258 · 111th Congress) Drinking Water System Security Act of 2009 - Amends the Safe Drinking Water Act to revise and expand requirements for assessments by covered water systems of their vulnerability to intentional acts of sabotage. Defines “covered water system” as a public water system that is a community water system serving a population greater than 3,300 or that presents a security risk requiring the issuance of regulations. Directs the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in consultation with states and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to issue regulations to: (1) establish tiered risk-based performance standards for the security of covered water systems and requirements and deadlines for such systems to conduct and update vulnerability assessments; (2) develop, implement, and revise site security and emergency response plans for such systems; and (3) provide annual training to system employees and contractor employees. Authorizes the Administrator to designate any chemical substance as a substance of concern in issuing water system security standards. Requires the Administrator to provide covered water systems with baseline information about probable threats to disrupt the safe and reliable supply of water, cause a release of a substance of concern at the covered water system, or steal, misuse, or misappropriate a substance of concern. Requires a covered water system under this Act to: (1) describe in its site security plan an assessment of methods to reduce the consequences of a chemical release from an intentional act and the roles and responsibilities of employees in responding to an intentional act of sabotage; (2) submit its vulnerability assessment and site security plan to the Administrator for review; (3) correct any deficiency found in its assessment or plan; (4) prepare or revise its emergency response plan to incorporate the results of the most current vulnerability assessment and site security plan; and (5) maintain an updated Latest action (2009-10-23): Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 179.
Why this matters
Community drinking water systems remain a designated critical infrastructure sector, and the 2009 bill illustrates a long-standing but unrealized congressional push to impose enforceable EPA sabotage-security standards beyond the post-9/11 vulnerability assessment regime. Its failure helps frame why current water sector security continues to rely largely on voluntary standards, ISAC information sharing, and America’s Water Infrastructure Act risk assessments rather than prescriptive federal mandates.