Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Commission Act
Key claim: The bill would remove the CFPB from the Federal Reserve System, reestablish it as an independent agency, and replace its single director with a five-member bipartisan commission removable only for cause.
Abstract
(HR3445 · 119th Congress) Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Commission Act This bill restructures the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and creates a five-member commission to manage the bureau. Currently, the CFPB is an autonomous bureau within the Federal Reserve System and is led by a director who is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The bill removes the CFPB from the Federal Reserve System and reestablishes it as an independent agency. The commission established by this bill is composed of five members appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, with one member selected by the President to serve as chair of the commission. No more than three commissioners may be members of the same political party. The bill also sets forth provisions regarding terms, quorums, and vacancies. The bill specifies that the President may a remove a commissioner for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. The bill also revises the membership requirements of the Consumer Advisory Board. The board advises and consults with the CFPB regarding relevant consumer financial laws and provides information on emerging practices in the consumer financial products and services industry. Currently, at least six members must be appointed upon recommendation of the regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents. The bill removes this requirement and requires at least half of all members to have private sector experience. Latest action (2025-05-15): Referred to the House Committee on Financial Services.
Why this matters
Converting the CFPB from a single director to a five-member bipartisan commission would materially change how consumer financial regulation is made: enforcement priorities, rulemakings, and supervisory posture would require cross-party negotiation, likely slowing swings between administrations. Removing the Bureau from the Federal Reserve System and re-establishing it as an independent agency also intersects with the pending Humphrey’s Executor questions in Trump v. Slaughter, since for-cause removal for commissioners is central to the proposed design.