Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe
Key claim: The Supreme Court held that federal courts may not create new causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute for violations of international law norms, and that the Torture Victim Protection Act does not provide for aiding-and-abetting liability, effectively ending ATS-based human rights suits against corporations like Cisco.
Abstract
U.S. Supreme Court opinion decided 2026-06-23, by Amy Coney Barrett. (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
CISCO SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL. v. DOE ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–856. Argued April 28, 2026—Decided June 23, 2026
Plaintiffs contend that the Chinese Government persecuted them be- cause of their religious beliefs, and that Cisco Systems, Inc. enabled that persecution by developing surveillance technology that allowed China to identify and apprehend them. Plaintiffs allege that Cisco and its executives are liable for aiding and abetting violations of interna- tional law, citing the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). One plaintiff also seeks to hold two Cisco executives liable for aiding and abetting violations of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA). The ATS grants federal district courts jurisdiction over “any civil ac- tion by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §1350. The ATS lay mostly dormant for two centuries after its enactment. In the last few decades, however, litigants have urged courts to allow private rights of action under the ATS for various alleged human rights abuses. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692, this Court held that “the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of ac- tion.” Id., at 724. At the same time—and in considerable tension with that point—the Court said that the ATS allows for the possibility of new, judicially created causes of action to enforce norms of interna- tional law. Id., at 724–725. Though Sosa did not “close the door” on judicially created rights of action under the ATS, Sosa emphasized the narrowness of its view and underscored the need for “vigilant door- keeping.” Id., at 729. Sosa proposed a two-step framework for creating those causes of action: First, a plaintiff must show that the norm has a “definite content and acceptance among civilized nations,” id., at 732; second, a plaintiff must show that it would be prudent for the court to create the proposed cause of action when the political branches have not acted, id., at 726, 736, n. 27. Since Sosa, the Court has never 2 CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. v. DOE
Syllabus
created an ATS right of action.
In this case, the District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint, but
the Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part. The Ninth Circuit focused
on whether aiding-and-abetting liability may be imposed under the
ATS. 73 F. 4th 700, 716. At Sosa’s first step, the Ninth Circuit found
that “aiding and abetting liability is sufficiently definite and universal
to be a viable form of liability under the ATS.” 73 F.4th, at 718. At
the second step, it concluded that neither “foreign relations concerns”
nor “deference to Congress” supplied a “prudential reason to decline to
recognize aiding or abetting liability.” Id., at 720. The Ninth Circuit
also held that the TVPA “encompasses claims against those who aid
and abet torture.” Id., at 744. The Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether Cisco may be held liable for aiding and abetting offenses
under the ATS, and whether two of its executives may be held liable
under the TVPA for aiding and abetting torture.
Held: 1. Courts may not create new causes of action for violations of inter- national norms under the ATS. Pp. 7–12. Two points drive the Court’s decision. First, judicial authority under Sosa’s second step was “narrow at the outset.” Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 593 U. S. 628, 636 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Sosa instructed federal courts to exercise “great caution in adapting the law of nations to pri- vate rights,” 542 U. S., at 728, and to assess the “practical conse- quences” of creating new liability under the ATS, including the “risks of adverse foreign policy consequences.” Id., at 728, 732–733. Because ATS cases by their nature implicate foreign policy, it is difficult to think of a case in which a court “might safely conclude” that a new ATS cause of action would not have detrimental foreign policy conse- quences. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U. S. 241, 284 (2018) (GORSUCH, J., concurring). Second, the power to create causes of action belongs to Congress. See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U. S., at 727; Nestlé, 593 U. S., at 634–635 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). The Court has “rejected the prac- tice of fashioning rights of action as [it] see[s] fit,” FS Credit Opportu- nities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd., 608 U. S. ___, – (slip op., at 3–4). Congress is better positioned than courts to evaluate the policy tradeoffs of creating liability. This is especially true in an area like this one, where the Constitution expressly delegates author- ity to Congress to “define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations.” Art. I, §8, cl. 10. For that reason, creating any cause of ac- tion “is an extraordinary act that places great stress on the separation of powers.” Nestlé, 593 U. S., at 636 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Because of these concerns, Sosa consciously designed a test that would be extremely difficult to meet. But what Sosa made difficult, subsequent legal developments have made impossible. Since Sosa was Cite as: 609 U. S. ___ (2026) 3
Syllabus
decided, the Court has firmly committed to the view that judicially cre- ated causes of action offend the separation of powers in almost every circumstance. Recent cases emphasize that “ ‘[i]f there are sound rea- sons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a dam- ages remedy, the courts must refrain from creating it.’ ” Egbert v. Boule, 596 U. S. 482, 491 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. 120, 137; alterations omitted). In the ATS context, there will always be at least a “single sound reason” to conclude that Congress might not want the judiciary to take the lead. Sosa itself identified one applicable in every case: “the possible collateral consequences of making international rules privately actionable.” 542 U. S., at 727. And Congress has cre- ated an “alternative remedial structure”—the TVPA—which precludes the creation of a cause of action. Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 137. The Court therefore will not continue to “indulge the fiction” that creating new ATS causes of action is sometimes appropriate. Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U. S. 255, 274. Correcting Sosa’s unfulfilled prediction will not upset reliance interests and will promote stability. Sosa was overly optimistic in its prediction that there might be a narrow class of cases in which courts may create ATS actions without infringing on the prerogatives of the political branches. In truth, this class is a null set. And because courts cannot create new rights of action to remedy violations of international law, there is necessarily no liability for aid- ing and abetting such violations. 2. The TVPA, which contains an express cause of action against someone who “subjects” another to torture, does not provide for aiding- and-abetting liability. Pp. 12–14. In Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, the Court held that §10(b) of the Securities Ex- change
Why this matters
Cisco v. Doe removes a significant civil-liability threat that had loomed over U.S. tech companies whose hardware, software, or AI/surveillance systems are alleged to facilitate human rights abuses abroad, shifting accountability off the federal courts and onto Congress, executive export controls, or foreign jurisdictions. For platforms and emerging-tech vendors, the decision narrows litigation risk for overseas conduct even as export-control, sanctions, and ICTS supply-chain regimes remain the active levers. It also reshapes the incentive structure around ‘know-your-customer’ diligence for dual-use AI and surveillance technologies.