Blanche v. Lau
Key claim: The Supreme Court held that the INA does not require border officers to have clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident committed a crime involving moral turpitude before treating that resident as an applicant for admission subject to inadmissibility removal proceedings.
Abstract
U.S. Supreme Court opinion decided 2026-06-23, by Clarence Thomas. (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
BLANCHE, ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL v. LAU
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
No. 25–429. Argued April 22, 2026—Decided June 23, 2026
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Government can remove aliens applying for admission to the country if they are “ ‘inad- missible,’ ” and it can remove aliens already admitted if they are “ ‘de- portable.’ ” Campos-Chaves v. Garland, 602 U. S. 447, 451. In this case, respondent Muk Choi Lau, a Chinese citizen, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2007. On May 7, 2012, New Jersey charged Lau with trademark counterfeiting. While awaiting trial, Lau temporarily left the United States for China. On June 15, 2012, Lau attempted to reenter the United States by present- ing himself to a border officer at the airport. Lawful permanent resi- dents generally must be regarded as already admitted to the country and usually do not have to reapply for admission when they return from temporary overseas travel. 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(13)©. Under an exception, the Government may regard a lawful permanent resident as “seeking an admission” (and thus as not already admitted) if he “has committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2),” §1101(a)(13)©(v), including a crime involving moral turpitude, §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Because of Lau’s pending criminal charge, the bor- der officer did not regard Lau as already admitted, but instead paroled him pending the resolution of his criminal case, meaning that Lau was allowed to physically enter the country without being formally admit- ted. After Lau pleaded guilty to his trademark-counterfeiting charge on June 24, 2013, the Government initiated removal proceedings against him. At those proceedings, the Government charged Lau as an applicant for admission who was inadmissible for having been con- victed of a crime involving moral turpitude. Lau argued that he was a lawful permanent resident already admitted and subject to removal 2 BLANCHE v. MUK CHOI LAU
Syllabus
only on deportability grounds. 130 F. 4th 42, 44. The Immigration
Judge found Lau removable as charged, and the Board of Immigration
Appeals affirmed. Lau sought review in the Second Circuit, which va-
cated the removal order. It concluded that Lau should have been re-
garded as already admitted upon arrival unless the border officer had
“clear and convincing” evidence that Lau had committed the crime,
which it held that the officer lacked. Id., at 46. Without that evidence,
the court concluded, border officers must regard lawful permanent res-
idents as already admitted, which precludes removal on inadmissibil-
ity grounds. The court remanded to the agency without prejudice to
the Government’s ability to charge Lau with deportability. Because
the Second Circuit’s decision conflicted with those of the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits, the Court granted certiorari.
Held: The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not require a bor- der officer to have clear and convincing evidence that a lawful perma- nent resident has committed a crime involving moral turpitude before deeming the resident an applicant for admission. Pp. 5–9. (a) Removing a lawful permanent resident on a charge of inadmissi- bility involves two steps: at step one, only commission of the crime is required to show that the alien could be regarded as seeking to be ad- mitted; at step two, conviction or admission is required to show that the alien seeking to be admitted is inadmissible. Lau was correctly charged with inadmissibility. At step one, the Government regarded him as an alien seeking admission because he had committed a crime involving moral turpitude before attempting to reenter the country. At step two, he was inadmissible and therefore removable because he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The Second Circuit resisted this straightforward analysis based on a conclusion that the Government had the burden “to prove by clear and convincing evidence that [Lau] actually committed the crime in question at the time of reentry.” 140 F. 4th, at 47 (emphasis added). The statute imposes similar burdens in other situations, but nothing in the INA says that the Government has the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the alien is an applicant for admis- sion. The Second Circuit derived its clear-and-convincing-evidence re- quirement not from the statutory text, but from inapposite Board of Immigration Appeals precedent. Correct or not, the Board imposes this burden on the Government only “at the time of the removal hear- ing,” not at the border. Matter of Valenzuela-Felix, 26 I. & N. Dec. 53, 57, 64. Here, the Government satisfied its burden at the hearing: Lau’s guilty plea was clear and convincing evidence that, before he at- tempted to reenter the country, he had committed the crime in ques- tion. The Court declines to read into the INA an additional clear-and- convincing-evidence burden on border officers entrusted with making Cite as: 609 U. S. ___ (2026) 3
Syllabus
“quick judgments on the spot” when that burden is nowhere in the statute or even Board precedent. Luz Munoz v. Holder, 755 F. 3d 366, 371. Pp. 5–7. (b) Lau’s remaining arguments lack merit. Lau argues that the same clear-and-convincing-evidence standard that the Board applies during the removal proceeding should apply to the border officers de- termining that an applicant is seeking an admission. But nothing in the INA supports that argument. Lau also suggests that a lawful permanent resident may be regarded as seeking admission only after being convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, citing this Court’s footnoted dictum in Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U. S. 257, 275, n. 11. A straightforward reading of the statutory text contradicts Lau’s interpretation. Section 1101(a)(13)©(v) says that a lawful permanent resident may “be re- garded as seeking an admission” if he “has committed” a crime identi- fied in §1182(a)(2), which includes “a crime involving moral turpitude.” §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Under §1101(a)(13)©(v), the Government may regard a lawful permanent resident as seeking admission as soon as he “committed a” crime involving moral turpitude “even if (as in [Lau’s] case) the conviction occurred” later. Barton v. Barr, 590 U. S. 220, 232. Section 1101(a)(13)©(v) incorporates by reference only the crimes §1182(a)(2) identifies, not its requirement of conviction. Pp. 7–9. © The Court does not decide whether Lau’s crime was one involving moral turpitude, but remands the case to the Second Circuit for further proceedings. P. 9. 130 F. 4th 42, vacated and remanded.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 1
Why this matters
The decision lowers the evidentiary bar border officers must meet before stripping a returning lawful permanent resident of the procedural protections normally afforded LPRs and instead placing them in inadmissibility removal proceedings, where the burden shifts to the noncitizen. Practically, LPRs traveling abroad face greater exposure to detention and removal based on officer suspicion of a crime involving moral turpitude without a conviction, affecting green card holders’ ability to travel and their due process protections at ports of entry.