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Dossier SCOTUS opinion 25-jun-2026
A decided U.S. Supreme Court ruling — binding legal precedent nationwide.

Mullin v. Doe

Key claim: The Supreme Court held that the TPS statute bars judicial review of non-constitutional challenges to TPS terminations and that equal protection claims alleging racial motivation in Haiti’s TPS termination are unlikely to succeed, reversing lower court orders that had postponed the terminations.

Abstract

U.S. Supreme Court opinion decided 2026-06-25, by Samuel Alito. (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1

                                   Syllabus

     NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
   being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
   The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
   prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
   See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                   Syllabus

      MULLIN, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
     HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. v. DOE ET AL.

CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

 No. 25–1083.       Argued April 29, 2026—Decided June 25, 2026*

The question presented is whether respondents, who challenge the ter- mination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for aliens from Syria and Haiti, are entitled to orders postponing the terminations during litigation. Congress created TPS in 1990 to provide short-term hu- manitarian relief for aliens who cannot safely return to their home countries. Although designed to afford temporary relief, TPS designa- tions in practice have often lasted for decades. Syria received a TPS designation in 2012 because of “extraordinary and temporary conditions” related to the repressive regime of Bashar al-Assad, 77 Fed. Reg. 19027, and in September 2025, the Secretary of Homeland Security provided public notice that Syria’s TPS designa- tion would terminate, 90 Fed. Reg. 45402. Seven Syrian nationals sued in the Southern District of New York asserting claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to stop the termination. The Dis- trict Court concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to interim relief under 5 U. S. C. §705. The Second Circuit denied the Government’s request for a stay. Haiti received a TPS designation in 2010 after a devastating earth- quake, 75 Fed. Reg. 3477, and in November 2025, the Secretary pro- vided public notice that Haiti’s TPS designation would terminate, 90 Fed. Reg. 54739. Five Haitian nationals sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia asserting claims under the APA and charging

—————— *Together with No. 25–1084, Trump, President of the United States, et al. v. Miot et al., on certiorari before judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 2 MULLIN v. DOE

                              Syllabus

that the termination of Haiti’s TPS designation violated the constitu-
tional right to equal protection because it was motivated by race. The
District Court granted interim relief, and a divided D. C. Circuit panel
declined to issue a stay. The Government sought a stay and a writ of
certiorari before judgment in both cases. This Court granted review,
consolidated the cases, and deferred ruling on the stay applications.

Held: 1. The TPS statute bars judicial review of non-constitutional claims. Pp. 12–18. (a) Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) provides that “[t]here is no judicial review of any determination of the [Secretary of Homeland Security] with re- spect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state.” The term “determination” may mean either an in- dividual decision or the process leading to a decision. Under either understanding, §1254a(b)(5)(A) bars all of respondents’ non-constitu- tional claims. Further, the phrase “with respect to” “generally has a broadening effect, ensuring that the scope of a provision covers not only its subject but also matters relating to that subject.” Patel v. Gar- land, 596 U. S. 328, 339 (internal quotation marks omitted). Pp. 12– 13. (b) Respondents and the courts below offer no sound theories to over- come the plain meaning of the judicial-review bar. Pp. 13–18. (1) Respondents’ argument that §1254a(b)(5)(A) applies only to substantive claims, not those based on alleged procedural errors, finds no support in the statutory language because a “determination” may concern procedural or substantive questions. Respondents’ reliance on McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479, and Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, is misplaced because those decisions turned on the specific wording of different pro- visions and did not adopt the broad principle that the term “determi- nation” applies only to substantive matters. Pp. 13–15. (2) Doe respondents’ argument that “determination” refers only to an assessment of country conditions finds no support in the statute’s text or context and contravenes the principle that we give common terms their ordinary meaning. See Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation, 594 U. S. 338, 353. Pp. 15–17. (3) Respondents’ attempt to limit the judicial-review bar to the Secretary’s ultimate “determination”—not any subsidiary decision—is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statutory text and contra- dicts the administrative-law principle that subsidiary decisions merge into final agency action. See Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 578 U. S. 590, 597–598. Pp. 17–18. 2. Miot respondents’ equal protection claim—that Haiti’s TPS desig- nation was terminated because of race—is unlikely to succeed. Cite as: 609 U. S. ___ (2026) 3

                            Syllabus

Ironically, respondents themselves offer a race-neutral explanation for the Government’s action: namely, that the current administration, which has terminated every TPS designation that has come up for re- newal, simply opposes the TPS program as it has been implemented in the past. The Court assumes for the sake of argument that heightened scru- tiny applies and that it must determine whether a “discriminatory pur- pose [was] a motivating factor in the decision” to terminate Haiti’s TPS designation, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265–266. Because application of that standard calls for consideration of the context in which a challenged statement was made, id., at 267–268, the immigration context is an important factor. None of the cited statements by either the President or the Secretary was overtly racial, and in substance all expressed policy views that could rest on race-neutral justifications. Viewing all the relevant evi- dence, Miot respondents are unlikely to prove that race was a motivat- ing factor in the decision to terminate Haiti’s TPS designation, and it follows that they are not entitled to interim relief on their equal pro- tection claim. Pp. 20–24. Reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opin- ion of the Court except as to Part III–A. ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined that opinion in full, and GORSUCH and BARRETT, JJ., joined except for Part III–A. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ., joined. Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 1

                         Opinion of the Court

 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
 United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
 Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
 pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________

                     Nos. 25–1083 and 25–1084
                               _________________

MARKWAYNE MULLI

Why this matters

TPS beneficiaries — many from Haiti, Central America, and other designated countries — face loss of work authorization and deportation protection when terminations take effect, and this ruling significantly restricts their ability to seek judicial relief absent a constitutional claim. By treating race-neutral policy rationales as sufficient to defeat equal protection challenges at the preliminary stage, the decision raises the practical bar for discrimination-based litigation over immigration status decisions and reshapes the due process landscape for affected communities.

Source

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Briefing card

Mullin v. Doe
Stage: opinion · scotus · 25-jun-2026

The Supreme Court held that the TPS statute bars judicial review of non-constitutional challenges to TPS terminations and that equal protection claims alleging racial motivation in Haiti's TPS termination are unlikely to succeed, reversing lower court orders that had postponed the terminations.

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External: scotus:10880242

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