Watson v. Republican National Committee
Key claim: States may legally count absentee ballots that were postmarked by Election Day but arrive in the days afterward — federal law only requires that voters cast their ballots by Election Day, not that ballots be received by that date.
Abstract
U.S. Supreme Court opinion decided 2026-06-29, by Amy Coney Barrett. (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
WATSON, MISSISSIPPI SECRETARY OF STATE v.
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–1260. Argued March 23, 2026—Decided June 29, 2026
The federal election-day statutes set the day for the “election” of Representatives, Senators, and the President on a Tuesday in November. See 3 U. S. C. §1, 2 U. S. C. §§ 1, 7. Mississippi permits certain residents, such as college students away from home and senior citizens, to vote in federal elections by absentee ballot. Miss. Code Ann. §23–15–713. Mississippi is one of roughly 30 States that count at least some absentee ballots mailed by election day but received af- terward. Absentee voters in Mississippi may dispatch their ballots by mail or common carrier, and all absentee ballots must be “postmarked on or before the date of the election and received by the registrar no more than five (5) business days after the election.” §§23–15– 637(1)(a), (3). In 2024, the Republican National Committee, the Mississippi Re- publican Party, and various individuals sued the Mississippi secretary of state and several election officials, contending that federal law pre- vents Mississippi from counting absentee ballots received after elec- tion day. According to plaintiffs, the election-day statutes use the word “election” to refer to two acts—ballot casting and ballot receipt—so by setting the day for the “election,” these statutes set the deadline for both. The Libertarian Party of Mississippi filed a similar suit, and the District Court consolidated the cases, and then granted summary judg- ment to Mississippi. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Missis- sippi’s statute is preempted because the federal election-day statutes require ballots to be received by election day. Held: The federal election-day statutes do not prevent Mississippi from counting absentee ballots postmarked by election day but received up 2 WATSON v. REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE
Syllabus
to five days thereafter; nothing in the federal election-day statutes re-
quires ballots to be received by election day. Pp. 5–21.
(a) The question before the Court is narrow: whether counting bal-
lots postmarked by election day, but received up to five days later, vi-
olates the federal election-day statutes. Plaintiffs do not challenge the
general practice of absentee voting, the use of the Postal Service or
common carrier to transmit ballots, early voting, or the counting and
certification of votes after election day. The Court also does not
consider the scope of Congress’s authority to regulate federal elections.
P. 5.
(b) The federal election-day statutes do not preempt Mississippi’s
law because the defining element of an “election” has always been the
electorate’s choice of candidate. And a related federal statute—the
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)—
confirms that while federal law dictates when ballots must be cast,
state law governs when they must be received. It is a “fundamental
canon of statutory construction that words generally should be inter-
preted as taking their ordinary meaning at the time Congress enacted
the statute,” New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U. S. 105, 113 (internal
quotation marks and ellipses omitted), and at all relevant points, the
word “election” was understood to mean “[t]he act of choosing a person
to fill an office,” N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English
Language 433. The Court has likewise defined “election” as the ex-
pression of the electorate’s choice, explaining that “[f]rom time imme-
morial an election . . . has been . . . no more and no less than the ex-
pression by qualified electors of their choice of candidates.” United
States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 318.
The electorate’s choice is made when voting is complete, not when
ballots are received. The most recent amendment to the Presidential
election-day statute bears this out. While inserting the phrase “elec-
tion day” into the statute and marking that date as a specific Tuesday,
Congress also provided that when States “modif[y] the period of voting”
in response to certain force majeure events, the term “election day”
shall “include the modified period of voting.” 3 U. S. C. §21(1)
(emphasis added). That Congress defined “election day” with reference
to “voting” indicates that “voting” is the act governed by the statute.
UOCAVA—which requires States to permit absent military and
overseas voters to cast absentee ballots in federal elections and, as a
backup, establishes a federal absentee voting system, 52 U. S. C.
§20302(a)(1)—reinforces the point. In detailing this system, UOCAVA
repeatedly presupposes ballot receipt is a matter of state law. For
example, to avoid any double counting, UOCAVA provides that federal
absentee ballots “shall not be counted” if a State receives the voter’s
state absentee ballot by “the deadline for receipt of [that] ballot under
Cite as: 609 U. S. ___ (2026) 3
Syllabus
State law.” §20303(b)(3). If the election-day statutes established a nationwide ballot-receipt deadline, UOCAVA’s references to state ballot-receipt deadlines would make little sense. Finally, this interpretation is consistent with the Constitution’s requirements for the electoral college. The Constitution requires the “Day on which [the electors] shall give their Votes” to be “the same throughout the United States,” Art. II, §1, cl. 4, but says nothing about the day for receipt. The Constitution thus envisions a system in which receipt of votes is necessarily divorced from voting. And it sets the crucial, uniform day as the day of voting while leaving receipt to happen later. The federal election-day statutes follow the same pattern. Pp. 5–9. © Plaintiffs’ contrary view—that the election-day statutes require ballots to be received by election day—relies heavily on historical practice, precedent, and policy. But the historical practice plaintiffs identify is not dispositive; plaintiffs overread the Court’s precedent; and policy cannot override the words Congress chose. Plaintiffs em- phasize that in the mid-to-late 19th century, ballot receipt occurred on election day, and that in the Civil War-era, States that authorized ab- sentee voting imposed strict election-day deadlines for ballot receipt. But plaintiffs admit they cannot precisely tie this historical practice to the text of the election-day statutes. State legislatures may have used an election-day deadline for any number of reasons unrelated to fed- eral requirements. For example, they may have shared plaintiffs’ view that an election-day deadline avoids the appearance of fraud from late- arriving ballots. At bottom, plaintiffs’ theory is that because 19th- century election-day statutes govern here, so too do 19th-century voting practices. But statutes do not “tra[p] in amber” every contem- porary practice on the same subject matter. United States v. Rahimi, 602 U. S. 680, 691. Plaintiffs’ in
Why this matters
Post-Election Day ballot receipt windows are used by roughly a third of states and disproportionately benefit voters facing mail delays — military and overseas voters, rural voters, and voters with disabilities. A Supreme Court ruling that federal election-day statutes preempt these state windows would require ballots to be in hand by Election Day nationwide, likely increasing rejection rates for late-arriving mail ballots; a contrary ruling would preserve state authority to design absentee systems. The case sits at the intersection of federalism, voting access, and election administration.