National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Comm’n
Key claim: Political parties can now spend unlimited amounts in direct coordination with their candidates on campaign activities, because the Supreme Court struck down the federal law that had capped such coordinated spending as an unconstitutional restriction on free speech.
Abstract
U.S. Supreme Court opinion decided 2026-06-30, by Brett Kavanaugh. (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE ET AL. v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 24–621. Argued December 9, 2025—Decided June 30, 2026
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) restricts a political party’s spending on campaign activities in coordination with candidates. 52 U. S. C. §30116(d). In 2001, this Court upheld those coordinated- expenditure limits as consistent with the First Amendment. See Fed- eral Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431 (Colorado II ). Petitioners—a group of candi- dates and political party committees—challenged FECA’s political- party coordinated-expenditure limits under the First Amendment, ar- guing that Colorado II is no longer good law. In light of Colorado II, the en banc U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected peti- tioners’ First Amendment challenge. This Court granted certiorari. Held: FECA’s political-party coordinated-expenditure limits violate the First Amendment. Pp. 6–26. (a) The Court has jurisdiction under Article III. At the outset of the litigation, at least one of the plaintiffs—then-candidate for Senate JD Vance—undisputedly had standing. Vice President Vance still main- tains an active “Statement of Candidacy” on file with the FEC indicat- ing his intent to run for Senate in 2028, as well as a campaign commit- tee that has raised money for a Senate race, establishing that this dispute is justiciable. Pp. 5–6. (b) The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” This Court has determined that political parties—as well as candidates, private individuals, and out- side groups—may make unlimited independent expenditures during political campaigns. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 39–59 (per cu- riam). This case concerns FECA’s limits on spending by political 2 NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N Syllabus
parties in coordination with candidates. Pp. 6–21.
(1) FECA limits political-party coordinated expenditures. FECA’s
limits impair the party’s traditional forms of communication such as
advertisements; preclude parties from amplifying the voice of their ad-
herents; impose additional monetary costs and burdens on political
parties; and inflict a “stifling effect on the ability of the party to do
what it exists to do.” Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm.
v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 630 (opinion of Kennedy,
J.). Pp. 7–8.
(2) Statutory limits on contributions to candidates or parties are
subject to “closely drawn” scrutiny. McCutcheon v. Federal Election
Comm’n, 572 U. S. 185, 197 (plurality opinion). To satisfy that stand-
ard, a regulation may not be “disproportionate” and must be “neces-
sary” and “narrowly tailored” to its asserted goal. Id., at 199, 218, 220;
Federal Election Comm’n v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U. S. 289, 306.
The Court must assess: (i) the Government’s asserted interests in im-
posing the limits at issue and (ii) the fit between the limits and the
Government’s asserted interests. McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 199.; see
also Cruz, 596 U. S., at 305. The political-party coordinated-expendi-
ture limits fail to satisfy the closely drawn test. Pp. 8–10.
(3) To analyze FECA’s limits on political-party coordinated expendi-
tures, the Court must first assess the asserted governmental interests
justifying those limits. The Court’s precedents recognize only one con-
stitutionally permissible government objective for campaign finance
restrictions: “preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.”
McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 206–207. And “Congress may target only a
specific type of corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corruption.” Id., at 207. Par-
ticularly relevant here, this Court has recognized the risk of quid pro
quo corruption or its appearance when a donor’s contributions to a po-
litical party are earmarked—that is, “are directed, in some manner, to
a candidate or officeholder.” Id., at 211 (quotation marks omitted).
Ultimately, the First Amendment question in this case boils down to
whether FECA’s limits on political-party coordinated expenditures are
permissible in order to prevent circumvention of the base limits on con-
tributions to candidates through earmarked contributions to parties.
In Colorado II, this Court said that they were. 533 U. S., at 462–463.
But Colorado II applied deferential scrutiny to Congress’s political-
party coordinated-expenditure limits. Id., at 463, n. 26, 465. Since
Colorado II, however, the Court has emphasized that under the closely
drawn test, judicial review must be “rigorous.” McCutcheon, 572 U. S.,
at 197. Under that more demanding standard, the Court agrees with
petitioners that the political-party coordinated-expenditure limits are
not proportionate, necessary, and narrowly tailored given the other
less-speech-restrictive tools available to the Government to prevent
Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 3
Syllabus
circumvention—in particular, earmarking and disclosure laws. With respect to earmarking laws: FECA treats an individual’s con- tributions to a party that are “in any way earmarked or otherwise di- rected through an intermediary or conduit” to a federal candidate “as contributions from such person to such candidate”—and thus subject to the limits on contributions to candidates. 52 U. S. C. §30116(a)(8). In McCutcheon, the Court explained that such earmarking rules con- stitute a targeted and constitutionally permissible way for the Govern- ment to prohibit circumvention of the base limits on contributions to candidates. 572 U. S., at 222–223. As JUSTICE THOMAS has explained: “Vigilant enforcement” of the earmarking rules is a more “precise re- sponse” by the Government to any “circumvention concerns.” Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 481 (dissenting opinion). With respect to disclosure laws: FECA requires that political parties and candidates publicly disclose both the contributions they receive and their spending on campaign activities, including on coordinated expenditures. §30104(b). As the Court emphasized in McCutcheon, disclosure has become a much stronger anti-circumvention tool over time because of “modern technology,” especially the Internet. 572 U. S., at 224. Importantly, it is the combination of the base contribution limits plus the earmarking rules plus the disclosure requirements together that serve the Government’s anti-circumvention interests here—with- out unduly restricting core political party speech. Given the meaning- ful prophylactic measures available to combat quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, the Court concludes that the political-party coordi- nated-expenditure limits at issue here are “disproportionate” and are not “necessary” and “narrowly tailored” for the circumvention interest. Id., at 199, 218, 220 (quotation marks omitted);
Why this matters
Coordinated-expenditure limits between parties and candidates have been a core structural feature of federal campaign finance for decades, and Colorado II (2001) was their key constitutional anchor. By overruling that precedent, the Court removes a statutory cap on how much party committees can spend in direct coordination with their nominees, likely shifting money and strategic control toward formal parties and reopening broader questions about the durability of coordination and contribution limits generally.